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Summary
Objectives: Multiresistant pathogens cause major clini-
cal problems and considerably increase treatment costs.
Since 2001 the Protection Against Infection Act (PIA)
obligates hospitals in Germany to the documentation of
multiresistant bacteria. We analyzed the use of these
data for routine internal surveillance.
Methods: We used standard data collected for the
mandatory documentation and studied consecutive
diagnoses of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) in a 893-bed tertiary level hospital in
North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. Based on the
Poisson distribution for the cumulative yearly incidence
of MRSA, we defined a threshold level for an outbreak.
Results: During a 12-month time period 80 patients
were diagnosed with MRSA. The time structure and
spatial distribution of different MRSA phenotypes (de-
fined through specific antibiotic resistance patterns)
were consistent with the within-hospital transmission.
In the two preceding time periods of 12 months each,
15 respectively 8 patients with MRSA were found. The
defined alert threshold level for cumulative yearly inci-
dence was crossed in the beginnings of the outbreak.
Conclusion: Monitoring the mandatory data collected
on multiresistant bacteria allows the early detection of
accumulations suspect for the within-hospital trans-
mission. This knowledge can be used for a fast reaction
and breaking off the transmission chains.
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Introduction
Nosocomial infections are an increasing
challenge for infectious diseases epidemiol-
ogy in industrialized countries. Multiresist-
ant pathogens cause major clinical problems
and lead to higher treatment costs [1]. In
2001, a new regulation Protection Against
Infection Act (PIA) was introduced with the
purpose of improving the monitoring of
multiresistant pathogens. According to § 23
of this law, the responsible German au-
thority (Robert-Koch-Institute, Berlin) de-
fined 12 bacterial pathogens and one fungal
pathogen with resistance towards from one
to six antibiotics (respectively groups of
antibiotics) to be of special concern and to
be mandatorily recorded by all German hos-
pitals [2]. This definition does not distin-
guish between multiresistant pathogens and
those that are resistant against only one
broad-spectrum antibiotic. We studied the
suitability of these mandatory data for the
internal surveillance in the case of an out-
break with methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus (MRSA).
Methods
During the time from June 2002 to July
2003, an increased number of MRSA cases
was observed in a 893-bed tertiary level
hospital in the state North Rhine-Westpha-
lia, Germany. We studied the mandatory
data on multiresistant bacteria and analyzed
the occurrence of same species with same
resistance patterns in time and spatial dis-
tribution over the different wards. When
cases appeared connected, transmission
chains were suspected.
We defined a threshold level for an out-
break when the number of observed MRSA
cases is unlikely to result from admission of
patients already colonized with MRSA.
Given the large number of patients treated in
a year in the hospital and the low number of
MRSA cases observed in the previous years,
when there was no evidence for an outbreak,
the probability for a specific number
of MRSA cases can be derived from
the Poisson distribution. The mean of the
cumulative incidence observed in two
previous time periods of 12 months is
used as the mean of the Poisson distribution
and percentiles are calculated. The thresh-
old is defined as the probability of <5% in
support of no transmission (i.e. when only
patients already colonized at admission
contribute to the cumulative incidence).
When a new patient is diagnosed with
MRSA, the number of MRSA in 12 months
ending on the day of the new diagnosis
is calculated and compared with the thresh-
old.
Results
Between July 2002 and June 2003 80 pa-
tients with MRSA were observed in the hos-
pital under study. In the two preceding
12-month periods the respective numbers
were 15 and 8 patients. Fifty-seven of the 80
patients had a specific pattern of resistance
(phenotype). Isolates from four of these pa-
tients proved to be genotypically identical
and were classified as a sub-clone of
“southern German MRSA strain” (Witte W,
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national reference laboratory for Staphylo-
coccus, Wernigerode, Germany).
Most of the cases (45 of the 57 cases with
the specific phenotype) were recorded on
a 14-bed surgical intensive care unit (ICU).
In the preceding time period of 12 months
only two cases of MRSA were observed
on the ICU. To rule out that an improved
detection of multiresistant pathogens was
the cause for an increased incidence of
MRSA on ICU, we compared the number of
bacterial specimen collected over the period
of the outbreak and during the preceding
year. Except for a slight increase on the peak
of the outbreak the number of specimen
remained stable. Similarly the increase in
multiresistant pathogens could not be
caused by an increase in the number of
patients staying on the ICU, because these
parameters remained stable. We are not
aware of any changes in diagnostic stan-
dards or regime, which could cause an
increased detection, either.
Most of the patients with MRSA ob-
served on other wards could have been in-
fected in connection with the cluster on
ICU. Some of these patients were for some
time patients on the ICU. Others had con-
tacts with patients from the ICU.
In addition, analysis of all multiresistant
pathogens according to PIA has shown that
55 patients have been involved in clusters of
bacteria with specific resistance patterns
other than MRSA between July 2002 and
June 2003. There were 23 cases with a
multiresistant Acinetobacter baumannii
(sensibility only towards carbapenems).
Thirty-two patients were involved in clus-
ters of other different bacteria that never
contained more than four cases. Our further
analysis focuses only on MRSA.
Besides the two preceding years for
which we could obtain numerical in-
formation, we knew from personal in-
formation that the number of MRSA in pre-
vious years was relatively low. Accounting
for some underreporting we assumed the
usual number of MRSA cases to be at 20 in
12 months, this resulted in an alert threshold
level at 28 patients in a year. The evolution
of the outbreak in terms of cumulative inci-
dence is displayed in Figure 1.The threshold
level was crossed at the end of 2002. The
outbreak developed quite slowly up to a
peak in April 2003, until it finally forced the
hospital to take some vigorous action: In the
beginning of May the ICU was closed tem-
porarily and all patients with MRSA were
discharged to other wards. Tracking the
possible routes of infection we almost regu-
larly found timely and spatial connections
between the involved patients indicating
possible chains of transmission. An excerpt
of the analysis of these chains focusing on
the ICU for the most prevalent phenotype of
MRSA in the first weeks of the outbreak is
shown in Figure 2.The spread of this pheno-
type started in the end of 2002, which is con-
sistent with the observation from the thresh-
old level.
Discussion
There are several limitations of our study.
First, we did not obtain information on ge-
notypes of the phenotypically identical bac-
teria except for four patients. Genotyping is
costly and not routinely performed outside
of university hospitals. We limited ourselves
to the readily available mandatory data,
which have the strong advantage that they
exist for all hospitals adhering to the PIA.
Resistance pattern phenotyping is regarded
to be a method of good specificity and poor
sensitivity to distinguish different bacterial
clones [3, 4].
In epidemiology of German MRSA, data
from 2002 indicate that prevalent genotypi-
cally determined clones mainly display dif-
ferent resistance patterns [5, 6]. We as-
sumed resistance pattern phenotyping not to
be much less sensitive compared to geno-
typing in this special epidemiologic situ-
ation. More problematic is the fact that only
few clones of MRSA spread in Germany
(about 85% belonging to four clones [5])
and quantitative data on their regional prev-
alence are not available. But these data are
needed to determine the discriminatory sen-
sitivity of genotyping with regards to deter-
mination of within-hospital transmission
[7].
We used the Poisson distribution to de-
fine the threshold level for an outbreak. This
is associated with two necessary decisions,
first with the choice of baseline yearly inci-
Fig. 1
Cumulative incidence of
MRSA cases per 12 months
and alert threshold for an
outbreak
Fig. 2
Follow-up of the trans-
mission chains of specific
phenotype of MRSA on the
ICU
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dence, which is regarded as normal, second
with the choice of probability threshold for
abnormal development. The baseline inci-
dence should include only cases prevalent at
admission to fulfil the requirement of statis-
tical independency. The baseline incidence
can be derived from observation of periods,
where there is no evidence of transmission.
Since the baseline incidence simply reflects
the prevalence of MRSA at admission,
screening of all patients at admission would
provide a direct estimation. However,
screening at admission is not performed in
most hospitals in Germany. A more sophis-
ticated way to obtain estimates of MRSA
prevalence at admission can be based on
mathematical modelling [8, 9]. This would
be of special value in settings with a higher
endemic level of MRSA, where simple ob-
servation cannot distinguish between trans-
mission and accumulation of cases colon-
ized at admission.
The probability threshold for abnormal
development (i.e. outbreak) has to be based
on clinical judgement and balance the spe-
cificity and sensitivity of the method. Dif-
ferent approaches have been proposed for
identification of abnormal patterns in oc-
currence of multiresistant pathogens based
either on rather sophisticated techniques
[10 – 13] or on comparison with other hos-
pitals in the same region [14]. The advan-
tage of our method is its simple use in rou-
tine settings based only on the mandatory
data collected according to the PIA. It can
be also used in regions with only few hospi-
tals, where a comparison between different
hospitals does not have statistical meaning.
Although we did not present tables for the
clinical use, the threshold levels adapted for
a specific hospital can be simply developed.
A frequently discussed problem is the
issue of underreporting of multiresistant
bacteria. Since we observed no change in
the number of specimen sent to the labora-
tory over a long period preceding the ob-
served outbreak, there seems to be neither
substantial over-detection nor under-detec-
tion in this case, at least on the level of the
proxy. Nevertheless, in some cases the use
of the same number of specimen could be
shifted from patients with low probability of
colonisation to patients with higher prob-
ability of infection. Such processes could
particularly take place when the vigilance
against MRSA is increased as during an out-
break. However this seems to have minor ef-
fects, especially on wards where the diag-
nostic procedures are highly standardized
as on ICUs. In the particular case, micro-
biological monitoring was routinely per-
formed twice a week (tracheal secrete and
urine sampling). For clinical purposes tra-
cheal secrete has the disadvantage of easy
contamination by oropharyngeal flora, but
it favors the detection of MRSA, which nor-
mally colonizes nose and pharynx.
We did not distinguish between infection
and colonization with multiresistant bacte-
ria, because both are of importance for the
transmission dynamic.
We think that monitoring and systemati-
cal analysis of the mandatory data on
multiresistant pathogens can be useful for
internal surveillance on the hospital level.
An alert threshold can be defined based on
observations from previous time periods.
Compared to other surveillance programs
on multiresistant bacteria, our approach
aims to be easily applicable in almost all
German hospitals by using mandatory rou-
tine data from microbiological laboratories
and a relatively simple epidemiological pro-
cedure. Observations from other outbreaks
are needed to confirm our results.
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